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IN PRAISE OF UNCERTAINTY:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ALLEN
Stephan Landsman*
Professor Ronald Allen and his colleagues have provided us, in a
separate article, with fascinating data derived from nineteenth-century
American court decisions regarding noneconomic damages.' Inspired
by these data and their interest in epistemology, they raise, in their
present piece, some challenging questions about the awarding of
noneconomic damages in tort cases. Their central contention is that
such damages are not based on facts that are "analytically or empiri-
cally verifiable ' 2 and therefore offend the Due Process Clause.
Allen notes at the outset that neither he nor his colleagues are tort
scholars.3 This gap in their backgrounds is significant because, as they
note, "[t]he life of the law truly has been experience rather than logic,
and a long-standing practice can compromise the most rigorous ana-
lytical implications."'4 To overcome that difficulty, Allen turned to the
historical data-the behavior of American courts in the nineteenth
century-to see how judges managed the awarding of noneconomic
damages. I believe they looked at the wrong place (America) and the
wrong time (the nineteenth century) in their effort to understand the
tort "experience."
The distinguished tort scholar Robert Rabin, writing in the Elev-
enth Annual Clifford Symposium entitled Who Feels Their Pain? The
Challenge of Noneconomic Damages in Civil Litigation,5 reminds us
that noneconomic damages have been with us for a very long time,
and that common-law courts have been the architects of both the
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University College of
Law; A.B., Kenyon College; J.D., Harvard University.
1. Ronald J. Allen & Alexia Brunet, The Judicial Treatment of Non-economic Compensatory
Damages in the Nineteenth Century, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2007).
2. Ronald J. Allen et al., An External Perspective on the Nature of Noneconomic Compensa-
tory Damages and Their Regulation, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2007).
3. Id. at 1249.
4. Id. at 1251 (citing O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1881)).
5. Symposium, Who Feels Their Pain? The Challenge of Noneconomic Damages in Civil Liti-
gation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 249 (2006).
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causes of action and processes relied upon to award them.6 By the
fourteenth century, English courts had recognized the tort of assault
and awarded damages for the psychic disruption that it causes.7 It has
generally been agreed that the twin purposes of such awards are to
recompense for the disturbance caused by the defendant's act and to
address actions that risk causing "breaches of the peace." 8 Once the
elements of the tort have been proven, it is up to the factfinder to
determine how much is needed to compensate for the injury, restore
the peace, and deter future assaults. This process has been utilized for
the last seven centuries. Although the monetary amount of damages
for an assault has never been viewed as "analytically or empirically
verifiable," judges and lawyers alike have recognized the propriety of
such awards.
Precisely the same story may be told about the tort of false impris-
onment. Here, again, psychic disruption is the harm for which an
award is made, and no "analytically or empirically verifiable" mone-
tary figure is sought or required. Since the fourteenth century, judges
and lawyers have recognized the propriety of such awards and have
relied upon jury decisions to fix the proper figure. 9
Although they are of more recent vintage, the defamation torts of
libel and slander are also long-established. Slander's place in the com-
mon-law courts was recognized no later than the sixteenth century,
with libel following perhaps a century behind. 10 The defamation torts
address reputational harm rather than mental tranquility; again, there
is no precise monetary predicate for the award of damages for either
the specialized category of slander per se or libel.1 In fact, defama-
tion damages are divided into two categories: general and special. As
to the former, "no proof of any actual harm to reputation or any other
damage is required for the recovery of either nominal or substantial
damages.., and the jury is permitted, without other evidence, to esti-
mate their amount."'12
In these long-lived torts, there is no factual price tag to guide the
factfinder when fixing damages. Each serves an important set of so-
6. Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangi-
ble Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (2006).
7. See I de S et ux. v. W. de S, Y.B.Lib.Assn. Folio 99, placitum 60; 1366 Y.B. 40 Edw. III 40,
placitum 19 (Assizes, 1348).
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 43 (5th ed.
1984).
9. Id. § 11, at 47 n.2.
10. Id. § 111, at 772.
11. Id. § 112.
12. Id. § 112, at 788 (citations omitted).
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cial goals through the recognition of the tort and the award of dam-
ages that reflect a social evaluation of the gravity of the offense and
harm caused. None has been the subject of a concerted challenge on
the basis that the award is not premised on a particular piece of fac-
tual proof. When the negligence tort was fashioned in the nineteenth
century, 13 a similar approach to noneconomic damages was employed.
It relied on the historical power of common-law courts to award dam-
ages for noneconomic harm and thereby advance a number of objec-
tives unattainable by an exclusive reliance on economic damages.14
The pain and suffering component, like the damages components of
assault, false imprisonment, and defamation, is fundamental to the
tort. Judge Richard Posner's famous opinion in Kwasny v. United
States makes the point best:
We disagree with those students of tort law who believe that pain
and suffering are not real costs and should not be allowable items of
damages in a tort suit. No one likes pain and suffering and most
people would pay a good deal of money to be free from them. If
they were not recoverable in damages, the cost of negligence would
be less to the tortfeasors and there would be more negligence, more
accidents, more pain and suffering, and hence higher social Costs. 15
Lest it be thought that awards for intangible injuries are an anti-
quated notion, it should be remarked that the awarding of such dam-
ages has been embraced in recently developed torts, reaffirming the
common-law conviction that such awards are essential to legal policy
and consonant with the processes of tort law. The intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress tort, recognized by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts in 1948, provides a convenient example. 16 The same is
true of a number of the privacy torts' 7 that have arisen in response to
Justice Louis Brandeis and Professor Samuel Warren's celebrated arti-
cle of 1890.18 Most recently, the courts have followed the same path
in developing the negligent infliction of emotional distress tort.19
13. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 350 (3d ed. 2005).
14. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995).
15. 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987) (cited in MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES 710 (8th ed. 2006)).
16. See Rabin, supra note 6, at 369.
17. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 117.
18. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
19. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994) (noting that the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress tort identifies a kindred but distinct form of harm and that nearly all
the states have recognized it).
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Allen and his co-authors insist that proof of a monetary price tag is
essential before noneconomic damages can be awarded. This require-
ment runs counter to the development of doctrine and practice in
torts. It would interfere with the goals and operation of a substantial
number of torts. It mistakes the caution of nineteenth-century courts,
renowned for their desire to control jury activity, 20 with the broader
consensus displayed in the historical development of the tort. Profes-
sor Paul Guyer, a friend and distinguished philosopher, once sug-
gested to me that an excessive infatuation with logic can be like
"cutting one's throat with Occam's razor." Here, I think, Allen and
his colleagues have mistakenly brought its blade to bear on tort, heed-
less of history and the needs of society.
It appears that Allen and his colleagues believe that certainty of
proof regarding the size of monetary loss is essential. Their faith in
certainty has a nineteenth-century air to it. Their approach fails to
take into account the uncertainties woven into the fabric of the world
around us. Albert Einstein taught us that the precision of the
Newtonian universe was illusory; his principle of relativity forced us to
recognize that frame of reference is critical and protean. 21 Werner
Heisenberg, through his uncertainty principle, called attention to the
inherent limitations of our ability to measure. 22 Kurt G6del demon-
strated the necessary incompleteness of any formal logical system.23
When faced with these insights, the great jurist and torts scholar Jus-
tice Benjamin Cardozo had this to say: "As the years have gone by,
and as I have reflected more and more upon the nature of the judicial
process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have
grown to see it as inevitable. '24
We live in a world where a great deal cannot be reduced to the
certainty of explicit proof. Early on, the tort system turned to the jury
mechanism to address the challenge of uncertainty. It is not that the
jury is perfect-no human system of measurement can be-but rather
that it speaks with the authority of our polity. When there is a paucity
of proof, as in the cases of the tort damages, then the jury is our desig-
nated decisionmaker. It can make mistakes and is sometimes in need
20. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 605-08 (exploring judicial reliance on the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence to control juries).
21. See generally ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY
(Robert W. Lawson trans., 1961).
22. WALTER GREINER, QUANTUM MECHANICS: AN INTRODUCTION 40-50 (1989).
23. KURT GODEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
AND RELATED SYSTEMS (B. Meltzer trans.:, Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1992) (1931).
24. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
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of correction, but under our constitutional scheme its assessment of
damages deserves great deference. 25
Common-law judges and lawyers have concluded that, if tort law is
to get its job done, some level of uncertainty is unavoidable. Perhaps
the most convenient example of this practical compromise, apart from
the damages context, can be found in the adoption of comparative
rather than contributory negligence.2 6 Over the course of the twenti-
eth century, courts across the United States have replaced the harsh
contributory negligence doctrine (pursuant to which any percentage
of plaintiff's negligence would bar all recovery) with an apportion-
ment of fault that allows partial recovery. There is no "analytically or
empirically verifiable" basis for the percentages of fault assigned by
the factfinder pursuant to the rule of comparative negligence-a prob-
lem that was acknowledged from the outset of the doctrine's develop-
ment.27 Yet courts forged ahead and made the change. 28 Certainty
had to yield to fairness.
Despite Allen's stimulating analysis, tort law must live with uncer-
tainty if it is to accomplish its goals. This is nothing new to the world
of torts. It is the way the common-law courts have worked for centu-
ries to address the very real harms done by some members of our
society to others.
25. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
26. See Landsman, supra note 20, at 605-10.
27. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 67, at 470.
28. See Landsman, supra note 20, at 610.
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